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RECENT DECISIONS

3. A natural consequence is the effect of a sine qua non
("but for") cause, tempered by popular reason and judicial discretion.
Whether the court will elect to restrict itself by even this most liberal,
organized whole requires a decision embracing it.
How -m EQuiTz

Divorce-The Effect of a Prior Divorce Judgment on a Subsequent Action for Alimony and Support-In 1946 plaintiff wife
procured a valid absolute divorce in Connecticut, which was her
domicile at the time, against her non-resident spouse upon constructive
service. Subsequently, she brought an action in California to obtain
alimony and support, at which time, she conceded that the "in personam" provisions of the Connecticut decree were invalid because of
lack of jurisdiction over her spouse. The former husband made a
general appearance in the California action, and appealed from the
judgement in favor of the plaintiff. Held: Reversed. The application
for alimony is a collateral proceeding or episode within the action for
divorce, authorized for a particular purpose, but dependent for its
maintenance upon the existence of the action. After the judgment
granting the divorce the plaintiff was no longer the wife of the defendant, and he no longer owed her any marital duty. From that
time she could enforce against him no obligation not imposed by the
court at the time of the judgment. Dimon v. Dimon, 254
P.2d 528
(Cal.1953).
The courts are divided on the question as to whether a wife's
suit for alimony, subsequent to a valid foreign divorce decree, may
be maintained. Local rules on that question depend, in the first instance, upon whether such a divorce is thought to be divisible or
indivisible in regard to its effect upon the marital status of either
spouse on the one hand, and upon the wife's right to alimony on the
other.'
There is a line of cases which support the view that a wife may
obtain alimony from her former husband, notwithstanding a valid existing ex parte divorce decree in a jurisdiction in which the husband
did not appear or reside. 2 These decisions point out that it was impossible for the wife to recover an allowance for support at the time
of the divorce decree because the court lacked personal jurisdiction
over the husband. If the question of support could not be litigated
I See Note, 28 A.L.R. 2d 1378.
2 Stephanson v. Stephanson, 54 Ohio App. 239, 6 N.E. 1005 (1936); Darnell v.
Darnell, 212 Ill. App. 601 (1918) ; Miller v. Miller, 186 Okla. 566, 99 P. 2d 515
(1940); Nelson v. Nelson, 71 S.D. 342, 24 N.W. 2d 327 (1946); Pawley v.
Pawley, Fla. 46 So. 2d 464 (1950); Searles v. Searles, 140 Minn. 385, 168
N.W. 133 (1918).
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after dissolution of the marriage, the wife would be forever denied
her day in court, and the husband would be allowed to escape the obligations incurred by his marriage merely by moving to another state.
Contrary to the above view a substantial number of courts hold
that the valid ex parte divorce decree automatically terminates the
wife's right to alimony as an incident of the marriage relationship.s
These courts rejected the wife's arguments that she could not obtain
alimony in the divorce forum for want of jurisdiction, that the question of alimony therefore was not adjudicated, and that she was
therefore entitled to an adjudication in a court in which she could
obtain jurisdiction of the defendant. They stated they were bound
by precedent, which rested on the general ground that:
".. . alimony is an incident of the marriage relation; that it
can only be allowed where the marriage relation exists; that
it may be allowed as a part of the decree of divorce; that the
severance of the marriage relation by absolute decree without
alimony terminates the right of alimony."'
The Wisconsin Court has not ruled on the issue as to whether
a valid ex parte divorce decree obtained by a wife in a sister state
will preclude her from suing her former spouse in Wisconsin for
alimony or support. However, the indications are that the court would
sustain the right of the wife to maintain such an action in one form
or the other. In an early case in which the husband obtained the out
of state divorce solely upon service by publication and the wife sued
to have the divorce set aside, it was held that such divorce was not
a bar to a subsequent action for divorce by the wife in Wisconsin.5
A concurring opinion by Taylor, J., pointed out that if the ex parte
divorce destroyed the marital status as to the husband, it equally destroyed such status as to the wife. However, since there was property
in Wisconsin owned by the husband at the time of the divorce, in
which the wife had an inchoate interest, which had not been secured
to her by the divorce, no other adequate provision having been made
for her as to alimony, a court of equity of Wisconsin might, upon
the ground of such foreign divorce, entertain an action for alimony
payable out of such property.
In a more recent decision, also involving an out of state divorce
by the husband, the court made reference to the concurring opinion in
the Cook case, 6 and stated that:
"It would seem that in this state a wife situated as was the
3Weldgen v. Weldgen, 115 N.Y.S. 2d 482 (1952); Staub v. Staub, 170 Md.
202, 183 A. 605 (1936) ; Shain v. Shain, 324 Mass. 603, 88 N.E. 2d 143 (1949);
4

Peff v. Peff, 2 N.J. 513, 67 A. 2d 161 (1949).

McCoy v. McCoy, 191 Iowa 973, 183 N.W. 377 (1921).
5 Cook v. Cook, 56 Wis. 195, 14 N.W. 33 (1882).
6Ibid.
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first wife might bring an action for alimony even though the
husband had no real estate or other property within it. Else
a man worth a million dollars in personal property might leave
the state, take all his property with him, go to Nevada and get
a judgment of divorce after staying there sixty days and thus
throw his wife and the burden of her support upon the public.'"
In the Ische case, 8 handed down just two months before the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the Estin case,' the
Wisconsin Court held valid an out of state divorce by the husband,
but retained jurisdiction of the cause as an original action for alimony
and support moneys. Since the wife alone appealed from a decree
granting her a monthly sum as maintenance, the question as to whether
the Nevada divorce precluded the court below from entertaining an
original action for alimony, was not raised in the Supreme. Court of
Wisconsin. It was held that the trial court had acquired jurisdiction
by the wife's commencement of an action to procure a divorce from
bed and board and the husband's personal appearance therein. The
award of alimony, was a proper exercise of jurisdiction under the
particular facts and circumtances of the case.
It would appear from these decisions that the Wisconsin court,
when faced with the issue, will sustain the right of the wife to maintain such an action in equity.10 This position is further substantiated
by the fact that these Wisconsin cases were all decided before the
Estin case," the broad language of which has convinced many legal
authorities that the United States Supreme Court is of the opinion
that a wife cannot be deprived of any "in persona" rights without
having the issue properly litigated. The court said:
"The fact that the marital capacity has changed does not mean
that every legal incident of the marriage was necessarily affected."12
If the Wisconsin Court should decide to entertain an action for
alimony subsequent to a valid ex parte divorce, another question would
logically present itself. Of what avail would such a decree be to the
wife if the former husband's real property was in another state or
the husband had removed his personal property to a sister state?
It may be pointed out that judgments and decrees of one state have,
under the constitutional full faith and credit provision,3 no operative
force of their own in another state until judicial action has been
taken thereon and their enforcement in such other state has been
7Price v. Ruggles, 244 Wis. 187, 11 N.W. 2d 513 (1943).

8 Ische v. Ische, 252 Wis. 250, 31 N.W. 2d 607 (1948).
9

Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948).

10 28 A.L.R. 2d 1401.
"1Supra, note 9.
12 Supra, note 9.

23 U.S. CoNsT. ART. IV, §1.
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sanctioned by the judgment or decree of the courts of such state.
As a result the wife would have to take her Wisconsin judgment to
the state in which her former spouse has property. Permitting the
wife to establish a decree of one forum as a decree of a forum in
another jurisdiction and so making available enforcement remedies
of the latter is a comparatively recent development. The lead in this
field was taken by California. 14 While there is a split of authority
among the states at present, the decided trend of the more recent
cases is to the effect that a decree for alimony represents more than
a debt. Its basis is said to be the natural obligation of the husband
to support his wife and children, which is a matter of public concern
whether the obligation is first judicially declared in the state of the
forum or elsewhere. The urgency for its effective enforcement is
equally as great in one state as in the other. Therefore, it should be
enforced by the same remedies as are applicable to domestic decrees for
alimony, such as contempt, sequestration, receivership, injunction, or
imposition of an equitable lien. 15
With the conflict that exists among the several states as to
divorce jurisdiction and procedure, it is an uncertain task to advise a
client as to what his property rights will be after he has obtained a
valid ex parte divorce. Unless uniformity among the states can be
obtained by legislation, ex parte divorces should be avoided where
substantial property rights may be involved, unless there are other
cogent reasons for the divorce that outweigh the property problem.
HAROLD A. DALL

Cummings v. Cummings, 97 Cal. App. 144, 275 Pac. 245 (1929).
1518 A.L.R. 2d 867.
'1

